ABSTRACT Modern vehicles equipped with a large number of electronic components, sensors, actuators, and extensive connectivity, are the classical example of cyber-physical systems (CPS). Communication as an integral part of the CPS has enabled and offered many value-added services for vehicular networks. The communication mechanism helps to share contents with all vehicular network nodes and the surrounding environment, e.g., vehicles, traffic lights, and smart road signs, to efficiently take informed and smart decisions. Thus, it opens the doors to many security threats and vulnerabilities. Traditional TCP/IP-based communication paradigm focuses on securing the communication channel instead of the contents that travel through the network. Nevertheless, for content-centered application, content security is more important than communication channel security. To this end, named data networking (NDN) is one of the future Internet architectures that puts the contents at the center of communication and offers embedded content security. In this paper, we first identify the cyberattacks and security challenges faced by the vehicular CPS (VCPS). Next, we propose the NDN-based cyber-resilient, the layered and modular architecture for VCPS. The architecture includes the NDN's forwarding daemon, threat aversion, detection, and resilience components. A detailed discussion about the functionality of each component is also presented. Furthermore, we discuss the future challenges faced by the integration of NDN with VCPS to realize NDN-based VCPS.
I. INTRODUCTION
Future Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) is envisioned as an autonomous, safe, economic, and environment-friendly network of vehicles on the road. ITS is realized through Vehicular Ad hoc NETwork (VANET) and consists of vehicles, traffic lights, road signs, Roadside Units (RSUs), handheld devices, and sensing, detection, and surveillance devices installed on the road or in vehicles. All ITS nodes are interconnected to share transportation-related information to make smart decisions. For instance, vehicles share their proximity, in-vehicle parameters, and traffic-related information with other vehicles or nearby network nodes in an ad hoc manner or through fixed infrastructure elements to manage transportation. Similar information is also shared with commuters to opt for efficient commute options.
Recently, most of ITS related research is focused on increasing the vehicle's smartness and autonomy through efficient control, stable and ubiquitous connectivity, information access and availability, and system reliability. ITS nodes, especially the modern vehicles embody the sensors and actuators-based control electronics and communication capabilities to sense their proximity and communicate with the other vehicles, infrastructure, and other mobile devices. Therefore, these modern vehicles are perfect examples of a Cyber-Physical System (CPS), which is defined as the holistic system of systems that brings a close synergy between control, computation, and communication. Most of the modern vehicles are equipped with a large array of sensors and actuators interfaced with the electronics nodes, called Electronic Control Units (ECUs) and Telematics Control Units (TCUs), to control physical components of the vehicle. Those ECUs provide interface to connect physical domain to the cyber domain.
Integration of the cyber domain in the vehicular system offers plethora of valued services, including the advanced transit system, intelligent traffic management system, safe pedestrian system, and so on. Simultaneously, it also unlocks the doors for many threats that exploit the system weakness and cause the system to malfunction. Currently, research and development efforts are mostly inclined towards the vehicle's autonomy through stable and secure control techniques [7] - [9] . The control mechanisms largely employ sensory data from the vehicles' direct Line of Sight (LoS) to increase the control accuracy. However, there are different scenarios where control actions must also consider the nonLoS information shared by the other ITS nodes, i.e., the collision warning, emergency vehicle approaching, the sharp curve ahead, black ice on the pavement, pedestrians on the crossing, weather and Location information, etc. Therefore, the accuracy of the communicated information plays a vital role in the safe ITS. Therefore, the communication between ITS nodes must also be secured and resilient to the cyber threats to ensure correct and prompt data access. The prime objective of Vehicular CPS (VCPS) is to realize a pervasive communication, computation, and control among all the ITS nodes and act as a unified transportation system [10] - [14] .
VCPS, as a system of systems brings pervasiveness, intelligence, and autonomy to the transportation system. Alongside, VCPS also brings the risk of malfunction, failure, privacy, safety, and so on. Therefore, resilience to all these risks must be established for a reliable and stable functionality of the system [15] . Communication, pertaining to be the integral component of VCPS and synergy between all VCPS subsystems is continually evolving and at the same time, vulnerable to many threats. Most common communication paradigms within ITS include vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V), vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I), vehicle-to-pedestrian (V2P), and vehicle-to-device (V2D). All of these communication modes are encompassed by the common communication mode, called vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication.
There are different communication standards that have been investigated to attain the above-stated communication paradigms, including but not limited to Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments (WAVE), Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC), IEEE 802.11p, IEEE 802.11, Long Term Evolution (LTE)-Advanced, IEEE 802.15.4, and so on [16] , [17] . All of these communication standards intend to increase communication efficiency and offer security as an add-on feature. None of these standards offer information security as an intrinsic feature except the recently proposed future Internet architecture, called Named Data Networking (NDN) [18] . NDN architecture is the detailed implementation of Content-Centric Networking (CCN) [19] . Data or content is at the core of NDN architecture. NDN intrinsically administers security of the content, which is its elemental feature. In NDN, the content is identified and communicated using the hierarchical name that is similar to the Universal Resource Identifier (URI) [20] . The content requesting node generates the interest packet encompassing the desired content name as well as the content related security information. Any node in the network that has the matching content reply with the data packet along with its security elements, e.g., digital signatures, to ensure content's integrity. As mentioned previously, the name identifies the content, not the provider, producer or forwarder of the content or their location. This feature avoids some targeted denial-of-service (DoS) attacks on the network. In this paper, we investigate the intrinsic cyber resilience extended by NDN for the VCPS. Main contributions of this paper are summarized below.
• We propose a detailed NDN-based architecture to offer cyber resilience for VCPS.
• In the proposed architecture, we introduce intrinsic resiliency features for VCPS.
• We also outline probable attacks on NDN-based resilient VCPS scenario and their countermeasures.
• We identify and discuss future challenges in VCPS.
Rest of the manuscript is organized as follows. The background information and previous work related to the cyberattacks in VCPS are given in Section II. Section III discusses the working principle, security, intrinsic cyber-resiliency features of the NDN, and NDN-specific cyber-attacks. In Section IV, the NDN-based cyber-resilient CPS architecture is explained in detail. Future challenges related to the cyber resiliency achieved through NDN in VCPS are identified in Section V. A detailed discussion on the future challenges faced by the NDN-based resilient VCPS is presented in Section V. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. VEHICULAR CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS
In this section, we outline in detail, the background of VCPS and different attacks mounted on VCPS.
A. VCPS BACKGROUND
A typical VCPS infrastructure is shown in Fig.1 , where all the vehicular network elements including vehicles, intelligent road signs and information boards, autonomous toll gates, traffic signals, road and traffic status detection sensors, and traffic management back office(s), are connected through wireless and wired communication mediums. All of these VCPS elements have capabilities of computation, communication, control through sensing and actuation that help realizing the VCPS applications, nation-wide traffic management, and intelligent logistics. Typical examples of VCPS applications include, but not limited to: • Dynamic eco-driving, • Signalized cross-walk Warning, • Autonomous traffic rule violation warning system, • Blind spot and lane change warning system, • Eco-freight management and control, • Adaptive traffic signaling system, • Pre-crash and forward collision warning, • Smart parking. We consider an example of the modern vehicle, which is an archetype of the CPS. Modern vehicles are equipped with a large number of electronic components, i.e., sensors, actuators, ECUs, and TCUs, to realize both partial and complete driving autonomy, and maximize commuters' safety. Every ECU carries out the in situ data acquisition and processing to control the physical vehicular component, including powertrain, chassis/safety, body/comfort-related components, driver's assistance system, telematics/infotainment, and so forth, through a multitude of sensors and actuators. These ECUs are connected with each other and communicate through networks of certain types, e.g., CAN (Controlled Area Network), MOST (Media Oriented System Transport), Ethernet, etc., as shown in Fig.2 . Using all this computation, control, and communication technologies within a vehicle help to realize the reliable and safe commute. However, due to the limited sensing capability and the range of sensors, a typical vehicle can only take the driving decisions based on the limited information. However, in order to completely realize any of the VCPS applications, a vehicle may require information from other nodes in the network. This information sharing between nodes is achieved through TCUs. In addition to the information communication, the software updates, patches and firmware updates are also communicated within the network through TCUs.
Today's vehicle can be visualized as a fast mobility enabled computer due to a large number of electronic components. All the VCPS elements are equipped to keep them ''always connected'' and access services provided by the network and communicate with other networked elements. Examples of these network interfaces include LTE, WiFi, DSRC/WAVE, ZigBee, etc. There is a very famous line ''everything is connected, everything is vulnerable'' [1] , hence, this increased connectivity has opened many possibilities to access the internal vehicle electronics and escalated the vulnerability. Nonetheless, security was not the prime focus of the vehicular design and manufacturing process because the vehicle was still considered as the stand-alone control system and the automotive manufacturers are focused more on fuel economy, collision safety, or something along this line than the cybersecurity. As a result, the intra-vehicular communication (the message exchange between ECUs, MCUs, TCUs, etc.) was of the open broadcast nature where any node can easily snoop and intercept all the communication [2] . Intravehicular communication was kept simple with no device identity or security information was part of the messages. Each component just sends the codes that are interpreted and the control actions are performed accordingly. Recently, most of the researchers are focusing and researching on the intravehicular communication security and authentication mechanism to secure the communication as well as to authenticate the components that are added in the vehicle [3] , [4] .
Not only the intra-vehicular but also the inter-vehicular communication has been vulnerable to attacks that anticipate acquiring control of the vehicle's electronics [5] , [6] . The external interface(s), e.g., long and short range TCUs and/or OBD-II, are/is used to carry out the remote attacks on the vehicle to gain vehicle's control remotely. In the following subsection, we briefly discuss the possible set of cyberattacks on the vehicular CPS.
B. CYBER ATTACKS ON THE VCPS
Introducing connectivity in the vehicles to communicate information over the network has increased possibilities of extensive intelligent cyberattacks on the vehicular systems. The objective of those attacks is to gain information access as well as the control of the physical vehicular system operations and its impact can extend to the level of a national disaster. Recently, several security researchers have demonstrated that how they exploited the system vulnerabilities and successfully launched their attacks on the connected vehicles [21] - [24] and other ITS infrastructure elements [25] - [28] to remotely gain physical control. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate the possible cyberattacks and analyze how the future networking architecture can handle those cyberattacks. In this section, we discuss the prominent cyberattacks that exploit the vehicular CPS vulnerabilities and their possible entry points in the vehicular CPS, e.g., different network TCUs, OBD-II, TPMS, and so forth, [29] . We provide few examples of the security attacks on the vehicular systems. The focus on the attack classification is out of the scope of this paper and readers are suggested to refer [5] , [30] - [32] and many other sources.
• DoS/DDoS Attack: Denial of Service (DoS) and Distribute DoS (DDoS) are the attacks where attacker(s) prevent(s) any communication or services between the targeted vehicle and the network. The attacker(s) may impersonate the identity to carry out the attack and consume targeted vehicle's resources that block the communication between the vehicle, its components, and/or other vehicular network elements. In case of vehicular CPS, the impact of DoS attack has mostly been investigated on the in-vehicle CAN network. Conversely, the DDoS attack has only been investigated for V2X application [34] - [36] . In literature, there are different schemes that perform DoS attacks on the intra-and inter-vehicular network to consume computation, communication, memory, and other network resources of the target vehicle [33] , [37] - [42] . The Intra-vehicular communication system was designed to be simple and envisioned to work as a standalone system without any security concerns. It is analyzed that the vehicle's communication system (e.g., CAN bus) cannot handle the DoS attack and suggested that a more robust solution is needed [40] . There are few works that demonstrated the DoS attacks on the roadside sensors and traffic lights to cause malfunction in the traffic detection and traffic light duration [25] - [27] . An authentication-based broadcast scheme has been proposed to prevent the DoS attack that consumes the computation resource of the network and proposed symmetric key cryptography [41] . There are other schemes that also presented the asymmetric key cryptography-based authentication scheme to authenticate broadcast traffic of the beacons. For example, the cooperative authentication schemes have also been proposed to avoid such attacks in VANETs [42] , [43] . The DoS and DDoS attacks are best summarized in [33] and [34] .
• Routing Attacks: Routing, in general, requires node IDs (e.g., IP addresses) that are maintained in the routing table to forward packets from source to the destination node. However, in vehicular network and VCPS, the routing may also require location, speed, heading direction, and other parameters to efficiently communicate information. The malicious node shares the spoofed IP, location, speed, heading, and/or other tampered information within the network to disrupt the normal routing process [47] - [51] . The routing disruption could be in the form of infinite routing loop, selective forwarding towards malicious or non-existing nodes, intentional packet drop, creating a sinkhole, intentionally delaying communication, and so forth.
• Man-in-The-Middle Attack (MiTM): A malicious node in the network eavesdrops the communication between two VCPS nodes and modifies the communicated packets by involving itself as a legit part of the communication. Injection of the false data in the packets severely compromises the network security and data authenticity, which can have a drastic impact on the safety and security of the passengers. It is argued [30] , [52] , and [53] that the authentication using digital certificates and confidential communication using public key cryptography can easily detect and avoid this type of attack.
• Malicious Software Updates: Most of the modern vehicles largely depend upon the sensors, electronic control components (e.g., ECUs, MCUs, TCUs, etc.), microprocessors, and software components to increase autonomy, safety and realize emerging features in the future transportation. The software updates are necessary to overcome the software vulnerabilities, bug fixes, and keeping the system compatible with the technological updates. However, in case of millions of the vehicles on the road, it is really challenging to collect data of all the vehicles and provide software updates around the globe. Over the Air (OTA) software updates from the trusted providers and integrity of the code is one of the challenges that must be tackled by the researcher [53] . Cerrudo [25] demonstrated how firmware of the traffic detection sensors could be updated, which could cause temporary or may be permanent damage to the sensors.
• Code, Command, or Packet Injection: The malicious parties try to exploit the software and system vulnerabilities to access vehicles either remotely or through the debugging interfaces (e.g., OBD, USB, and so forth.) and inject the malicious code or commands to completely take control of the system. The code or command injection in vehicular CPS is a reality and has been identified [25] demonstrated how fake traffic information can be injected through sensors deployed at the roadside to show congestion. The impact of the attack could be in the form of severe traffic jams, irregular traffic lights, wrong speed limits on the smart signs, and most of all, accidents.
• Data Integrity: Attacks on data integrity are not new in the CPS domain [60] - [63] , where the attacker disturbs the sensor(s) measurements by injecting the controlled external inputs. As a result, all components of the VCPS will fail to offer the trusted services to the users, vehicles, and other components of the system. In general, all VCPS components are susceptible to the data integrity attack. For example, Lin et al. [64] , [65] have qualitatively analyzed the data integrity attack on real-time traffic information manipulation that is generated and forwarded by the vehicles in the ITS. It is concluded that the attack can severely disrupt the route guidance information that may result in a severe traffic congestion, fuel efficiency, travel time, and other ITS resources. In literature, there are many schemes that discuss the GPS data falsification and its countermeasures [44] - [46] . Similarly, the location data integrity attack and its countermeasures for the railway sport transmission systems is proposed in [66] . In summary, the VCPS must timely detect and validate integrity of the data communicated within the system to avoid any disastrous situation.
• Replay Attack: In replay attack [67] , the malicious node observes the legit network traffic, records the packet information, and later inject similar packets in the network to repeat the same system operations. Such an attack has been discussed by Koscher [58] where the car lights information is intercepted and later used to malfunction the lights.
In literature, many researchers identified the security vulnerabilities and proposed attack resilient schemes for vehicular networks in general [68] - [76] . However, there are only a few works that just discuss the potential attack surfaces for the connected and autonomous vehicular CPS. Next, we discuss the working principle of the NDN in detail and then we highlight the procedures on how NDN intrinsically offers the cyber resilience if applied to the NDN-based VCPS.
III. NDN AND ITS INTRINSIC CYBER RESILIENCY A. NDN BASICS
Information-centric networking is the future Internet communication paradigm. Recently, several architectures for the future Internet have been proposed. The widely investigated architectures include Content-Centric Networking (CCN), a project of Palo Alto Research Center (PARC), and the Named Data Networking (NDN) that is the extended implementation of the CCN. NDN can operate stand-alone cleanslate as well as the overlay architecture on the current Internet. In the latter case, NDN simply works as the wrapper to communicate content over the current IP network.
As it is apparent from its name, NDN puts data or content at the center of communication rather than the nodes. The content is addressed and communicated using the hierarchical URI like content name, e.g., ''/road/section/ traffic/spatiotemporal/sensoryInfo/...''. Security is inherently embedded within the content while it is communicated. Hence, no static route(s) is/are secured and maintained to ensure content security, which is hard to achieve in the mobile network. Additionally, it is difficult to share the security-related information between communication parties while all the nodes are on the move. In-network caching is another feature of NDN that enables network nodes to store communicated contents to satisfy future requests. This feature minimizes the network traffic and increases the content retrieval efficiency.
NDN uses only two types of packets, called Interest and Data packet, to request or communicate content and its security-related information within the network. The content requesting node (consumer) sends an Interest message and the node holding the interested content, called provider or producer, replies with the Data message. Each content or its chunk is secured using the cryptographic signature, which is created by the producer and also communicated within the Data packet. Hence, any node can authenticate the content, which relinquishes the content's trust from the trust in network entities. A consumer needs to verify the authenticity of the content, however, the intermediate forwarders, nodes, or routers do not require verification process before forwarding. In case of caching the content at intermediate nodes, they must authenticate the content before caching in order to avoid cache poisoning or pollution.
The relationship between keys, digital certificates or simply certificates, certificate issuer or signer, namespace 1 , and the real world identity, is shown in Fig. 3 . Any network entity that has the real world identity (RWI), is represented by the name belonging to the NDN namespace. For example, the RWI belonging to DGIST can be expressed by a namespace as: building E3 in the ICE department of DGIST /ndn/kr/ac/dgist/ice/E3, or faculty member ABC of the ICE department in DGIST /ndn/kr/ac/dgist/ice/faculty/ABC. The certificate issuer or signer issues, revokes, and verifies the certificates that belong the RWI. These certificates represent the 1 Simply defined as the possible set of names to uniquely identify any entity within the network. The network entity includes key or key pair, digital certificate and signature, content, node, any real world identity, and so forth. The namespace follows certain rules, which are defined by the application, to integrate features and/or attributes that represent and identify the network entity. keys and bind those keys to the RWI. The keys are also named under the NDN's namespace. Next, we briefly discuss the basic working principle of the NDN.
B. NDN WORKING PRINCIPLE
As stated earlier, the NDN simply uses two packet types, Interest and Data packets, to achieve secure communication in the network. However, in addition to Interest and Data packets, NDN manages three data structures to realize stateful pull-based communication that are called Pending Interest Table ( PIT), Forwarding Information Base (FIB), and Content Store (CS). PIT keeps track of the Interests that are yet to be satisfied. It holds the Interest related parameters such as the NONCE, Interface from which the Interest was received that includes communication and application interfaces, and so forth. On the other hand, the FIB is used to forward Interest packet towards the upstream in the network. FIB holds name prefixes and their associated interfaces (called outFaces). Name prefixes are disseminated in the network to populate the FIBs in the network. In last, the CS caches contents, also including the digital certificates, that are communicated through Data packet. Caching in CS helps to efficiently disseminate content in the network and reduce communication overhead.
The application running over the consumer generates Interest when it requires the content. Consumer stores Name, NONCE, application interface (AppFace), and other parameters of the Interest in its PIT. Any node receiving the Interest first searches its CS for the requested content. In case of the successful CS search, the Interest receiving node sends content in the Data packet through same interface from which it received the Interest. Otherwise, the Interest is forwarded further in the network after recording the Interest parameters in the PIT at the Interest receiving node. When a node receives the Data packet, it drops the packets when it fails to find the valid entry in the PIT. The received Data packet is forwarded to interface from which the Interest was received. The PIT entry is removed once it is satisfied. If a node receives an Interest that is still pending (the node has still a valid entry in its PIT), the Interest is dropped by the node. The PIT entry is purged if a node receives the corresponding Data packet or the The signed Interest is also used to communicate secret key and security information encrypted with the consumer's public key. There may be some applications that only respond to the signed Interests and discard the unsigned one. Format of the Data packet is shown in Figure 5 (c). Each Data packet must include signature to prove the content integrity, origin authentication, and offer the provenance protection. The content element of a Data packet may carry the default binary large object (BLOB), key, link, Negative Acknowledgment (NACK), manifest, or any other byte stream. The previously stated types of contents and content related attributes are specified in MetaInfo element of the Data packet. When a node receives the Data packet, it checks its integrity and provenance through the signature in SignatureValue element of the packet. The Data packet containing the certificate is also signed and to prove its integrity, it may require to request another certificate until it reaches the CA, which is self-signed and trusted by all the VOLUME 6, 2018 network nodes. In result, it forms the chain of trust, which is shown in Fig. 6 . The attributes related to the signature and certificate information in the Data message is provided by the SignatureType and KeyLocator fields within the SignatureInfo field. The readers are suggested to refer [77] for further details.
C. NDN'S INTRINSIC CYBER RESILIENCY
The core characteristic of NDN is the utilization of digital signatures in Data and Interest packets. As stated earlier that every Data packet must be signed and the signature includes content and the name as well. In some use-cases, the Interest packet may also be signed over the partial name, including timestamp, NONCE, and any other name elements. The signature binds the name with the content and its provider too. As a result, it ensures multiple security aspects, including:
• Integrity, correctness, and authenticity of the content and the provider because the content along with its name is signed with the provider's private key.
• The name prefixes are advertised in the network to update the FIB and the content of these advertisements is also signed, which ensures the protection against routing attacks.
• Content name, which is a necessary element of both Interest and Data packets, does not reveal the address of the consumer and the provider. However, there are some methods that can be used to figure out the producer's identity from the name-key binding. This can help in avoiding the targeted source attacks including DoS, phishing, spear-phishing, and so forth [78] .
• Privacy can be achieved through sharing the encrypted Data between the consumer and provider by sharing the cryptographic key(s) through signed Interest-Data packets.
• Content communication through signed Interest-Data packets provides its authenticity, integrity, correctness, and privacy, which in turn provide defense against several attacks i.e., code and command injection, malicious software updates, spoofing, MiTM, and so forth.
• In some literature, the issue of content poisoning is also discussed [79] . The rationale discussed in those works is that the signature verification at the routers is not mandatory but the consumer does. However, in order to avoid content poisoning at the routers, they must avoid caching any unverifiable content and the content with an unknown trust schema [80] , [81] .
Even though the NDN provides cyber resilience against several attacks, there are still many challenges that require more deliberation from the research community. Further detailed discussion related to NDN's vulnerabilities in the context of NDN-enabled VCPS (NDVCPS) are presented later in the manuscript. The general NDN-specific attacks are discussed next and properly elaborated in [99] , which is recommended for further review.
D. NDN-SPECIFIC CYBER ATTACKS
As discussed above, NDN overcomes many conventional cyberattacks, however, it poses new NDN specific security attacks. Some of these attacks are briefly discussed below:
• DoS and DDoS: similar to DoS and DDoS attack in conventional communication [82] , the attacker(s) overload(s) NDVCPS network elements by generating the pull-based traffic to request contents, delegate name prefixes, certificates, and so forth. In general, the attacker(s) flood(s) network by generating Interest packets with content names that are created at runtime for dynamic contents (e.g., current traffic condition, nearby vehicle's sensory data, current traffic surveillance feed from road or vehicle camera, etc.) or nonexisting contents [83] - [85] . The objective of this attack is to exploit the stateful forwarding characteristic of NDN, the PIT [86] . It overwhelms the PIT of NDVCPS nodes, which in turn drop all the upcoming legitimate Interests. In literature, there are different schemes that detected these kinds of attacks and proposed the countermeasures [87] - [93] .
• Content Poisoning: Every Data packet in NDN contains the cryptographic signature of the content and its name, which must be verified by the consumer before forwarding it to the application. However, the content signature verification is not required for the intermediate forwarders or routers. The intermediate nodes may skip (or selectively skip) the verification process to balance the trade-off between security and the forwarding delay. The adversaries can exploit this option to disseminate malicious or invalid contents, contents with invalid signature in the network caches, which is termed as the cache poisoning attack. In NDVCPS, adversaries intend to inject false location, sensory content, traffic status information, map information, basic safety messages, Malware, software updates, and so forth. Contingent on the received fake content, a consumer requests similar content by using the exclude field to avoid receiving the same fake content. This type of attack is relatively difficult to launch in the self-certified naming schemes because the name itself is the digest of the content, which can easily be verified with negligible delay [20] . On the other hand, the attack is relatively easy to launch in the scenario where humanreadable hierarchical names are used to forward Data packets with the sole content-associated signatures. The other method to discard malicious contents from the network caches is the consumer initiated notification packet to inform all network nodes to purge the malicious content from their caches [78] - [81] , [87] , [99] - [104] .
• Cache Pollution: This attack colludes and falsifies the cache's locality or simply the content popularity distribution (e.g., Zipf distribution). The popularity of a content is important to secure its place within the cache because content's popularity is one of the important factor considered by the cache replacement policy. Content's popularity depends upon the number of Interests received by the node. Malicious node(s) frequently send(s) redundant interests for the desired content (that may be false or invalid content) to fake its popularity in the network. In result, the genuinely popular contents are removed from the cache due to the fakely increased popularity of the invalid content(s) that will severely impact the content distribution performance. This type of attack requires a sophisticated monitoring of traffic over interface, specific content, name prefix or domain, and so forth [102] , [105] - [110] .
• Cache Snooping: It is the technique to acquire information about the cached contents. The adversary sends Interests using different names, exclude option, and scope (hope limit) along with the Interest response time analysis, to detect the contents' privacy and access status to launch other attacks [111] . The very basic solution for this type of attack is to disable the caching, however, it eliminates the core benefits offered by the cache. Several research works have proposed different snooping detection techniques by monitoring the Interest traffic with excessive use of the exclude field [112] , Name anonymity [113] , Interest-Data round-trip time (RTT) [114] , name-space restriction [115] , and so forth.
• Routing: Routing in NDN solely depends upon the advertised name prefixes and population of FIB with those published name prefixes. Similar to content communication, content name prefixes are also communicated using the Interest-Data packets. A malicious node that masqueraded the system as a legit producer may send the malicious name prefixes. As a result, the communication forwarded to those prefixes is directed to the malicious node(s) that may return the malicious content or the Interest is forwarded to the network zones with no content availability. This type of attack can be avoided by signing the content prefixes along with its name that is used to share the name prefixes. In case of no content availability and receiving the malicious content, the source may generate NACK towards the upstream nodes to reduce the outgoing face rank in the FIB of the upstream forwarders. If a consumer receives multiple fake contents, it simply reduces the rank of the FIB outgoing face(s) associated to those routing prefixes.
There are different security issues in NDN ranging from naming privacy, signature privacy, lack of access control, and so forth that need a more careful consideration by the research community. Next, we discuss the NDN-based cyber-attack resilient architecture for the VCPS.
IV. NDN'S CYBER-RESILIENT VCPS ARCHITECTURE
Cyber resiliency had been investigated since so long and is still being rigorously researched because it is one of the most important domains of the future communication. NDN has been briefly investigated to offer efficient content communication in the vehicular networks [116] - [126] . However, there is not much discussion in the literature specific to NDN's cyber resiliency for the vehicular network. In this section, we briefly discuss the proposed cyber-resilient architecture for the VCPS and shown in Fig. 7 . According to the functionality, the proposed VCPS architecture is divided into multiple layers, such as; physical sensing and actuation layer, the cyber-physical control layer, and the cyber layer that constitutes the communication, computation, and storage. The main focus of this manuscript is to cover cyberresiliency offered by NDN along with the name-based content communication for the VCPS. In VCPS, we envision cyber-resiliency in terms of the actions that are executed by the pre-attack, peri-attack, and post-attack sections during the VCPS operations. The first section of the proposed architecture handles normal operations of the VCPS when the system works smoothly, however, it involves the measures to avoid any potential cyberattack, we call this the threat aversion. Next block of the proposed architecture, called threat detection section, is responsible to detect threats when the attacks are carried out on the system. Successful detection of the threat and avoiding the VOLUME 6, 2018 false positive is the main objective of this section. In case the system is under attack, the resilience module of the architecture is accountable to continue system operations under minimum operational conditions.
A. NDN DAEMON
NDN daemon embodies the CS, PIT, FIB, forwarding strategy, and other data structures to provide the core name-based content communication functionalities. These functionalities include, but not limited to; Managing and optimizing the CS, PIT, and FIB structures to increase system performance in terms of efficient memory utilization, fast name prefix and content search. Pull-based communication is the core content forwarding mechanism. However, there are many applications in VCPS where vehicle(s) may generate push-based traffic due to irregularity in sensory data. The interface or face ranking schemes are also used by NDN prioritize particular faces to forward traffic associate with the specific name prefixes. Similarly, there may be the case where congestion over the particular communication face(s) may occur, which must be managed to alleviate Interest-Data traffic congestion. Additionally, components of the NDN daemon encompass the name lookup service called the name resolution, signature verification, signature revocation, certificate management, and the trust management/automation system [94] - [98] .
B. THREAT AVERSION
Principal aim of NDN is the content-centric security because each content communicated along with its cryptographic signature to ensure its provenance and integrity. In order to achieve the content-centric security, each VCPS component holds and manages the cryptographic keys and certificates. These certificates are signed by the globally or locally trusted certification authority (CA). The threat aversion section uses the Interest-Data packet-based certificate communication protocol to issue and obtain the certificates. The content signature verification validates integrity, provenance, and authentication of the content and its producer. Signed Interest and Data are also used to share secret key(s) to ensure privacy of the communication. Hence, this module supports content, cache, name, signature, and privacy of all communicated information. Additionally, it is already discussed that all the Interests related to the similar name are dropped by the node if it has already forwarded copy of the same Interest. Privacy of the consumer and producer are also partially guaranteed because both Interest and the data packets do not contain address of any particular node. As a result, identity, cache poisoning, spoofing, specific DoS, and other attacks on contents are intrinsically avoided by the NDN.
C. THREAT DETECTION
NDN offers a new data-oriented communication framework to minimize the content-related security vulnerabilities. However, NDN opens new possibilities of attack types and security challenges, i.e., DoS/DDoS, Cache Pollution, Cache Poisoning, routing, and so forth [99] . The core responsibility of this component is to monitor the Interest-Data traffic, audit cache operations, signature and security policy verification and administration, and even monitoring the in-vehicle communication (IVC), if NDN is applied in the IVC. The DoS and DDoS related attacks intend to clog the communication resources by generating the excessive traffic in the network. Therefore, the traffic generated over a particular interface, for specific name prefix, and for a meticulous content domain must be monitored to successfully detect these types of attacks. NDN intrinsically avoids the targeted traffic clogging because it does not use the node addresses and also the in-network caching diffuses and restricts the Interest traffic within the network. Additionally, the PIT also intrinsically avoids the Interest traffic because it aggregates similar content names requested in multiple Interest packets, which may be received from different communication interfaces.
Caching is one of the most important characteristics of NDN as well as the VCPS to store and share map-related data, multimedia contents, route-related information, security associated contents, traffic statistics, and so forth. A vehicle must keep the popular and important contents within its cache and must avoid unnecessary removal of those contents and/or addition of the forged contents. The superfluous change in the cached content priority and the request frequency are monitored to avoid content pollution. Another way to avoid content pollution is to ensure and support the signed Interest traffic only. The signature verification is an important functionality of this component and it must be executed for every content before caching it to avoid the cache poisoning. Additionally, the signature verification of the forwarded traffic detects the integrity, correctness, and authenticity of the communicated content. This content could be code, command, software update, name prefixes, or malicious content to avoid several attacks, including, but not limited to, malicious software update, prefix hijacking, black hole, injection of malicious code, command, or contents, routing, and MiTM attacks.
The other attack points in the autonomous vehicles are the ports e.g., OBD-II, USB, etc., and short-range communication ports that directly interact with the IVC. Hence, the IVC traffic should be monitored. It is worth mentioning here that there are different communication standards adapted in IVC, including Ethernet, MOST, Lin, FlexRay, and so forth. All of these standards have diversified set of message and communication steps that make them more difficult to unify the communication of all those standards. In results, a new paradigm that is worth exploring is to investigate NDN in the IVC, especially in the Ethernet and MOST type of IVC.
D. RESILIENCE
The resilience component of the proposed architecture is responsible to adapt and prepare the system to resist the cyber-attacks and continue working during the disruptive conditions. Most of the attack resilient related works in the CPS domain merely focus on the estimating the correct sensor behavior when CPS is under attack. Actions of this component solely depend upon the steps taken by the threat aversion and detection sections. Therefore, we discuss actions taken by the resilience component in relation to the other core components of the architecture that are briefly discussed above.
In case, the DoS and DDoS attacks are detected by the threat detection due to large Interest traffic over the specific interface or particular name prefix domain, the Resilience section takes the following actions without disrupting the normal operations of the system [87] :
1) It reduces the traffic rate related to specific name prefix or incoming interface. The Interest traffic above estimated rate is dropped. 2) Notify the other routers (especially the edge routers) about the attack and its relevant information including name prefix, interface, rate, etc. This will limit and push the attack back to the attack source(s).
3) It also includes the prefix or the interface in the blacklist for certain duration that depends upon the severity of the attack. 4) In the worst case scenario, the Interests related to the specific domain or received from the particular incoming interface are dropped and the name prefix is removed from the FIB. This state is also notified to the routers as well as the sources to change the content naming and/or enable the Interest authentication to block the attack at the extreme edge of the attacker.
Next, we discuss the actions of the resilience section in response to the cache related attacks, which primarily include the content poisoning and cache pollution. In case of the content poisoning, the content is dynamically evicted based on the notification received from the downstream nodes, failure of signature verification, or precipitous change in content popularity and traffic. The CA may also be requested for revocation of those certificates and also these certificates are enlisted in the blacklist that is maintained at the router. In order to prevent false eviction notifications, which may be generated by the malicious nodes, those requests must be enforced to include authentication information to verify their legitimacy.
The content replacement policy considers popularity of the content as one of the main parameters in the content replacement or eviction decision. Therefore, the legit contents could be removed from the cache in result of the successful cache pollution attack. To avoid the content pollution attack, the signature of the arbitrary content must be verified and the traffic against this content must be blocked. The similar actions that are suggested for the cache pollution, must also be taken by the Resilience component of the proposed architecture. Additionally, the content related certificates, caching decisions in the network, Interest traffic, and even the content source should be blocked within the network.
The prefix hijacking and black hole attacks in NDVCPS cannot be avoided. However, if these attacks are detected by the node, it must notify the downstream nodes through PushBack notifications or NACKs to isolate the attacker, name prefix, or the outgoing interface over which the attack has been commenced. The IVC and access through the OBD-II or the short range interfaces could be restricted if they fail the signature verification and other security measures offered by the NDN. The other attacks, including the MiTM, routing, malicious software update, spoofing, and code injection are VOLUME 6, 2018 intrinsically avoided by the NDN through digest and signature verification of the Interest-Data packets.
V. FUTURE CHALLENGES
NDN intrinsically offers resilience against several cybersecurity issues such as content integrity, authentication, provenance, spatial anonymity, and so forth. However, it opens a new kind of challenges that are under investigation by different researchers that are actively proposing solutions to the problems in this domain. In this section, we briefly highlight the cyber-related challenges and open issues faced by the NDVCPS. Based on our survey of the CPS and NDN literature, we identified the following open challenges to realize the cyber resilient NDN based vehicular CPS.
• Access Control: In NDVCPS, every consumer can request contents from the network including the vehicle's sensory or diagnostic information, traffic status, road condition, traffic signal information, status of the pedestrian at the signalized crossing, and so forth. However, due to the sensitivity of the data only authorized consumers must be allowed to access the specific contents from the network. This type of access control is achieved as follows: While generating the confidential contents, the producers must encrypt these contents. In order to decrypt these contents, only the authorized consumers are allowed to access the decryption key (that can be the same as encryption key-symmetric key) from the producer of the data or the trusted node in the network. NDN applications can enable access control through specific naming convention to depict finegrained access control details. The main objective of the content producer or the trusted node is to determine and manage the authorized consumers and securely provide decryption key to those consumers using consumer's public key encryption mechanism. Management of the authorized consumers and content access attributes in the network are challenging tasks and need rigorous investigation [127] - [129] .
• Anonymity: vehicle, driver, organization, or company's identity could be revealed by the hierarchical humanreadable names and their associated digital signatures. In order to support anonymity in communication, the secure naming or self-signed naming schemes are proposed. However, the self-signed names face aggregation and management issues in the NDN forwarding daemon. As a result, the researchers have proposed some hybrid naming schemes containing the human-readable name prefix and the content digest. Further investigation on the applicability, efficacy, and scalability of the hybrid naming scheme is yet to be determined.
• Multimodal Content (Multi-sources or -producers of the identical content): In the NDVCPS use-case, there can be multiple producers of the content that is requested by a single Interest. Let, an auto emission monitoring application running on a consumer requests the current CO 2 information from all the vehicles within a particular area or road segment, then all the vehicles with produce the emission information (multimodal emission data) [130] . This multimodal data must be forwarded to the consumer application to precisely predict the emission status and take necessary actions. However, NDN does not support the single Interest multiple Data. NDNbased resilient VCPS must support multimodal information discovery granularity to improve performance of the VCPS applications.
• Group Signatures and Verification: As outlined above, there can be multiple distinct Data packets from the producers in response to a single Interest and these Data packets should be aggregated by the consumer in some NDVCPS scenarios. Evidently, NDN requires each Data packet to carry its signature and the consumer requires digital certificate to verify the signature of each packet. Instead of retrieving individual certificates, there must be a method to minimize the signature verification delay and traffic. The group manager may administer the security credentials of different network elements in the group or they may achieve the same in a distributive manner.
• Spatiotemporal Security Binding: Most of the NDVCSP applications require the spatiotemporal bound contents. For example, the traffic status application may require very recent or current (time t) information about the vehicles positioned within the specific region and sends Interest packet with name ''/road/section/traffic/t/status/..''. All the vehicles in that region must share their signed information with the consumer application. The digest and its verification process must also count and validate the spatiotemporal parameters of the content shared by the NDVCPS network elements. The spatiotemporal characteristics of the content also help in identification of the threat. The spatiotemporal attributes of the content can also help in the regularization and granulation of the access control.
• Agreed upon Trust Schema: There are several digital signature schemes, such as digital signature algorithm(DSA), RSA-based signature algorithm, elliptic curve DSA (ECDSA), Edwards-curve DSA, and so forth, that have different key generation, signing, verification latency, signature size, and key size. The efficiency of the algorithm depends upon the operation response time and easy of signature communication and management. Therefore, it is difficult to select one scheme fit for all applications due to the involvement of diversified range and number of devices (small sensing devices with small memory and slow processing power, average processing and memory size OBUs, and the fast back-end servers large data banks.), involved in the NDVCPS scenario. Additionally, there should be a systematized relationship between content and the key names.
• Content Eviction: NDN offers content authentication, integrity, and provenance. However, if a malicious content is cached in the network, it must be identified and evicted swiftly. Content eviction is triggered when either the caching node receives an eviction request from the consumer or the content verification fails. There may be the case where a malicious node may generate the content eviction request to illegally evict the valid content. Hence, the eviction request must be verified before removing the content from the cache. Cached content must be verified periodically by the caching network elements to avoid malicious content dissemination in the network.
• Secure IVC: Future vehicles require high-speed and secure IVC to connect LiDAR, cameras, sensors, visual detection and recognition device, and other bandwidth demanding devices in the vehicle. The current IVC standards, including CAN, LIN, and their counterpart systems fail to meet these system requirements and do not support any effective security functionality. As a result, the industry, as well as the researchers, are investigating the use of Ethernet in the IVC. It is envisioned that the Ethernet with overtake IVC in the long-term. However, there is not any standard security mechanism to overcome all the security solutions, i.e., detection and identification of the malicious ECU, traffic, and sensors. In literature, there is not a single work that investigates the use of NDN in the IVC. Therefore, we suggest the research community to investigate the feasibility study of NDN in ICV. We envision that the utilization of NDN in IVC will resolve several security issues and simplify the communication mechanism and broaden the application realm of NDN application.
• Real-Time Requirements of NDVCPS: Real-time computation, control, and communication of the control instructions and information in NDVCPS are necessary to meet the requirements of the reliable and safe driving and commute. NDN uses namespace to forward Interest-Data packets, which requires a network-wide consistent and proper namespace information availability. On the contrary, it is really difficult for the vehicular network nodes to publish and disseminate the namespace information due to the intermittent nature of the network. Hence, NDN must ensure synchronization of the namespace in the network to guarantee the timely communication of the packets in the system. Additionally, the NDVCPS must be scalable to ensure prompt dissemination of the multitude of sensory data in the network that is produced by a very large number of vehicular network elements. In literature, there are few works that focus on the real-time multi-party video and audio communication over NDN [131] - [134] . However, there is need to investigate the effectiveness of NDN forwarding daemon under critical requirements of the NDVCPS ranging from the driver's response time, emergency braking, collision warning, to the real-time incident video sharing. There are several other NDN related challenges including efficient and distributed spatiotemporal caching, resolution of DoS/DDoS, replay attack, MiTM, and so forth, need to be investigated in the NDVCPS scenario.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated the cyberattacks and security challenges in the VCPS. The detailed discussion associated with the working principle of NDN architecture and its intrinsic cyber security features are also identified. In addition to that, we explicitly proposed the NDN-based architecture for the cyber-resilient VCPS. The proposed layered architecture includes several functional components ranging from the NDN daemon, threat aversion, detection, and resilience provision. In last, we identified the security challenges encountered by the NDVCPS scenario that must be addressed by the research community in future to ensure proper cyber resilience in the network.
